Trends and Cycles in Capital Formation by United States Railroads, 1970-1950 by Melville J. Ulmer
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Trends and Cycles in Capital Formation by United States
Railroads, 1970-1950





Chapter Title: Long-Term Trends
Chapter Author: Melville J. Ulmer
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9503
Chapter pages in book: (p. 14 - 24)Long-Term Trends
The growth of the railroads since 1870 is best depicted bythe value of
road and equipment expressed in 1929 dollars, shown in Chart 1. This
series is designed as an approximation of fixed physical operatingcapi-
tal, embracing all the physical property of the railroadsexcept unim-
proved land, the relatively small quantities of working capital(such
as coal) held, or those facilities (such as hotels) not used in direct
connection with road operation.
The broad pattern of development is distinct. Therate of growth
CHART1
Value of Road and Equipment, U. S. Railroads
F've-Year Moving Averages, 1872-1949
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Ratio scarewas obviously brisk in earls' years and leveled off gradually to the point
at which the series reaches its peak at about 24 billions of 1929 dollars
early in the decade of the 1930's, about three times its value in 1872.
From this year onward there is a nearly steady decline to about 1947,
when the total value of road and equipment in 1929 dollars was 22
billion, eight per cent below its peak value. This was by far the longest
period of decline in the entire span under review hut was followed by
a modest recovery. 1-lowever, at the start of 1951 the value of road
and equipment was still 6 per cent below its peak.
Throughout the period 1870-1949 the relative growth of the rail-
roads declined. This is clearly seen when annual rates of change arc
computed between the peaks of the long cycles that are marked in this
series, as given in Table 2. The annual i-ate of increase declined from
2.9 per cent in the 1874-1884 period to less than I per cent in 19 15-
1931 and, finally, to a small negative rate of change in 1931-1949.
Capital Formation
The absolute rates of change in value of road and equipment are of
course identical with net expenditures for reproducible capital, which
TABLE2
Average Annual Per Cent Change in the Value of
Road and Equipment, Constant Dollars, 1 874-1949
Terminal date rather than peak date.
Source: Forthcoming monograph on capital formation and financing by public utilities.
Peak dates were determined by drawing tangents above each pair of adjoining cycles
in the series. This is equivalent to assuming that the secular trend is approximated
by a straight line in logarithms (that is, by a curve of constant relative growth)
Lvtwcen each pair of adjoining cycles. Experimentally, peaks wete determined by
reference to a secular trend described by a curve of the form log ya + bt + ci',
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are depicted in Chart 2. Although it may not be atonce visually evi-
dent, these absolute rates of change also tendto decline throughout
the period studied. To be sure, if attention iscentered upon short-run
phenomena, the five-year movingaverage of net capital formation
rather clearly reached its all-time peaksome time during the period
1907-1911. But from a secular viewpoint itwill be noticed that the
very high peak in this period is coupled with very low troughsin 1897
and 1920. The effect is clearly illustrated by thefigures in the second
column of Table 3, whichmeasure the average annual net capital
formation in successive long cycles during thisperiod, measured from
trough to trough.
Thus net capital expenditures amountedto about 320 millions of
1929 dollars in 1876-1886, droppedto about 260 million on the aver-
age during the next cycle, remained about thesame during 1897-1920,
and dropped precipitously thereafter. Duringthe upswing from 1934























































Average Annual Capital Expenditure5,1876-1948
tmflhions of 1 929 dollars)
Net Capital Gross Capital
Long Cycles's Formation Formation
Terminal years of cycles are weighted one-half to avoid double-counting.
Measured from trough to trough; sec Tables 4 and 5. For alternative dates see
Tables 6 and 7.
Terminal date rather than cyclical trough.
Source: Forthcoming monograph on capital formation and financing by public utili tics.
period when investments were limited by govcrnmcnt material con-
trols, net capital formation on the average was negative.
From the standpoint of the impact upon the economy, however, the
net capital formation series gi-ossly overstates the decline in importance
of the railroads. For it must be borne in niind that a positive net capital
expenditure, however small, signifies an expansion in the total capital
stock and that, as this stock grows, the capital flow required to main-
tain it generally grows as well. The total volume of capital consumed
continued to mount gradually (see Chart 3). The net rise up to 1931
is due to the expanding volume of road and equipment in use. The
net rise in subsequent years, during which the total capital stock experi-
enced a small net decline, is due to a shift in the composition of the
operating properties of the railroads. Specifically, the proportion of
equipment -- particularly rolling stock - to the total advanced ma-
terially. The average length of life of such equipment is substantially
less than that of road.
flence the expanding capital stock, together with the changing com-
position of that stock, was a powerful factor in augmenting the gross
flow of physical capital to the railroads. During the period of the long
cycle 1876-1886, when net capital expenditures amounted to 326 mil-
lions of 1929 dollars per year and were higher than the average in any
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million annually. This was alreadya substantial figure. But by the
decadc 1940-1949, capital consumption had reachedan annual aver-
age of 525 millions of 1929 dollars, considerablymore than the average
net capital formation in any full cycle, as indicated in Table 3.
The gross flow of physical capital to the railroadsincludes expendi-
tures for replacement as well as for new capital (see Chart4). It
should be noted at once that while capital consumptionproceeds more
or less steadily (Chart 3), expenditures for replacementarcgener-
ally speaking- made on the same grounds as are other capital com-
mitmcnts. They too rest for their justificationupon an expected volume
of future business. The'arc in all probability nearly as sporadic, as
volatile, and as sensitive to the changingcurrents of business prospects
as are net capital expenditures; and in somerespects they arc indis-
tinguishable from them. Evenso, the gradual wearing out of operatingfacilities creates aneedfor capital formation that is independent of
continued net expansion and in the case of the railroads heavily bol-
tcrcd the volume of gross capital formation with thc passing ycars.
The general trend of gross capital formation rose appreciably from
1870 through the first decade of the twentieth century, while net capi-
tal formation declined (see Chart 4). Then, after 1910,as compared
with the precipitous drop of net capital formation, the secular down-
trend of gross capital formation was gentle. The all-time high ofgross
capital formation was reached in the five-year period centered in 1911,
at 1,123 millions of 1929 dollars.
Average annual gross capital expenditures during each of the long
cycles, shown in Table 3, confirm the genera] impression given by the
chart. They rise from the beginning of the period to a maximum in
1897-1920, when gross capital formation averaged 682 millionsper
annum. This peak was followed by a fairly moderate decline. The
final period 1 934-1948 includes some of the depressedor sernidepressed
years of the thirties, together with the war years during which invest-
ment was restricted by government controls. In the five postwar years
centered in 1948, the average gross capital expenditure per annum
CHART4
Gross CapitalExpenditures, U. S.Railroads
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Output, U. S. Railroads
Five-Year Movng Averages, 1 882-! 948
MIlons of 1929 dollO,,
0
Source: Table B'I.
was 642 millions of 1929 dollars. This figure, of which more than 80
per cent was for replacement of currently consumed capital, exceeded
materially the average gross capital expenditure during the first two
long cycles 1876-1886 and 1886-1897, when the net growth of the
railroad.s was so rapid.
Some Underlying Factors
As indicated above, the capital stock of the railroads declined from its
peak of 1931 to the end of 1950 by about 1.5 billions of 1929 dollars
or about 6 per cent. This decline is smaller, both in amplitude and
duration, than that suggested by some less comprehensivemeasures
used in the past, such as miles of road operated. The growing relative











'a 'a a,reflected in the lattcr series, may explain this difference. Indeed, the
actual decline may be even less than that measured by our own series
if full weight wcrc givcn to thc improver! efficiency of currently pur-
chased capital. Undoubtedly, there was considerable stability with some
slight net diminution in the capital stock over the third and fourth
decades of the twentieth century because of the well-known competi-
tion from motor vehicles and (to a lesser extent) air ttaflSj)ortatiOfl,
together with the depre&sed level of business in the thirties and the
limitations upon investment in World War II. But for the fact that
the nation as a whole -- particularly its population and its national
product -- showed substantial net growth over this period, the depress-
ing effect upon the railroads of these conditions would have been
considerably greater.
The reasons for the decline in the rate of growth of the capital stock.
both in relative and in absolute terms, from 1870 to the outbreak of
World \\Tar I are not so obvious. This was a period in which popu-
lation and the nation's productive capacity, as mirrored in the net
national product, rose at an increasing absolute rate and in which
competition from other forms of transportation was negligible. Aggra-
vating rather than relieving the initial perplexity here was the rise in
railroad output (Chart 5 and Appendix Table B- 1).
It would he tautological to suggest that the "explanation" of this
problem lies in the behavior of the capital-product ratio, depicted in
Chart 6. This is the ratio between accumulated, fixed reproducible
capital, and annual output. Specifically, this chart presents the ratio of
the five-year moving averages of the value of road and equipment to
the five-year moving averages of annual railroad output, both expressed
in 1929 dollars. Clearly an alteration in the ratio reflects nothing more
than the results of changes in output and in the concomitant flows of
net investment. Yet the behavior of the capital-product ratio warrants
some attention, for the pattern of its trend is strikingand suggestive of
other underlying factors of importance. Its level in the early years was
extremely high - at 15.0 in 1882, meaning that for every dollar's
worth of annual output there were fifteen dollars of accumulated in-
This series on output could be carried back only to 1880 because of the absence of
comparable source material in preceding years. It is based on weighted averages of
passenger miles and freight ton miles. See AppendixB for the details of its content.
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vestment in road and equipment. It fell rapidly, reaching 3.7 in 1917,
then continued down, though more gradually, to 2.5 in 1948. The trend
linc drawn through this series is intended to highlight this tendency
for steady decline at a diminishing rate.6 Why did the capital-product
ratio assume so lofty a level at the start of the period covered and then
decline, sharply at first but at a diminishing rate in succeeding years?
What does this behavior imply about the volume of investment?
An outstanding characteristic of the railroad industry is the indi-
visibility of niany of its units of capital investment. In order to provide
any service at all between two points, a minimum amount of invest-
ment is required in the grading of roads, in track, auxiliary structures,
and equipment. The capacity of this rnininium may easily exceed many
times the actual demands of business during a road's first years of
operation. Furthermore, once the initial huge investment is made in
the building of road and the construction of terminals, capacity may be
aThe trend line is a Gompertz curve, with equation:
Capital-product ratio(226) (8.7263)', where t is nieasured in years with 1880
as origin.
22extended by substantial amounts through relatively sinai! additions of
rolling stock, double track, or passing track. This phenomenon would
appear to be evidenced in the steady increase in the relative importance
of equipment, especially rolling stock, in the total volume of fixed
operating capital, which rose from 9 per cent in 1880 to 26 per cent
in 1917 and to 35 per cent in 1951.
This technical fact of indivisibility was coupled during the years of
rapid railroad expansion with another influence of importance in
determining the capital-product ratio - the distant horizon typically
envisaged by railroad builders. In numerous instances the completion
of lines was followed by strenuous efforts to encourage the establish-
mciii of towns and industries along an otherwise barren way. The
capacity of roads as initially established - both because of techniques
and ambitions -- was geared to a volume of business that could be
realized only with the passing of decades.
It would appear likely that such characteristics alone explain in the
main the high capital-product ratio encountered in the earlier years of
railroad operation and its steady decline since then. Two other factors,
however, became increasingly important in the post-World War I
period. First, there was a substantial rise in the average length of haul
in freight traffic and in the average distance traveled by passengers.
The former rose by more than 30 per cent and the latter by nearly 70
per cent between 1919 and 1950. These advanccs mirror in part the
development of the Western states and the concomitant rise in trans-
continental traffic and in part the greater diversion of short-distance
business to the automobile and truck.7 Their effect was to augment the
capacity output (as measured in passenger miles atid freight ton miles)
of existing road and equipment.
Coupled with this change was a succession of technological innova-
tions increasing the work capacity of freight cars, track, ties, locomo-
tives, etc. These can of course be more adequately described in engi-
neering literature.8 Suffice it here to note that the changes were substan-
tial, that they were not fully reflected in prices and that their net effect
For a description of these trends see Harold Barger, The Transportation Indust Ties,
1889-1946: A Study of Output, Employment, and Productivity (National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1951).
a Some examples of such technological advances arc provided in Barger, op. cit.
23would be to lower the capital-product ratio as it is measured in this
study.
Passing reference must he made to the fact that the dedinng capital-
product ratio had virtually no relationship to changing proportions
of capital and labor used in this industry. Indeed, the very factors dis-
cussed above, which contributed to the decline in the capital-product
ratio, were also in part responsible for a sharp reduction in the labor-
product ratio - i.e. for an increase in labor productivity. Output per
worker nearly tripled between 1890 and I 946.° Furthermore, the price
of labor rose much more rapidly over the period encompassed by this
study than did the price of capitala factor which, considered alone,
would have made for a rising capital-product ratio. That the latter did
not in fact materialize attests in some degree to the relative inelasticity
of substitution between capital and labor in railroading; muchmore
significant was the overshadowing force of the other factors described
above.
Given these factors which progressively reduced the amount of capi-
tal employed per unit of output, the behavior of railroad investment
over the period of study is more easily understood. In 1880 the capital-
product ratio was 15.0. By 1900 this ratio had declined to 6.5, by 1948
to 2.5. This sharp downward trend mirrors the tendency for each dol-
lar's increase in output to be accompanied bya progressively smaller
amount of investment over the time span studied. A dollar's increase
in the annual volume of output was accompaniedon the average by
$3.10 of net investment between 1880 and 1900, by $1.38 ofnet invest-
ment between 1900 and 1920, and by $0.74 between 1920 and 1950.
This differential impact over time of demandupon investment is of
course not purely technological in origin. It expresses, quantitatively, the
joint play of all the factors influencing the capital-productratio, de-
scribed in preceding paragraphs. As such--i.e. the quantitativeexpres-
sion of a composite of forces--- it provides the essential explanation for
the declining rate of increase in investment duringthe pre-World War
I period. It serves, along with the growingcompetition of other forms
of transportation, to explain the continuance of thistrend and the ulti-
mate appearance of substantial negative net investment in the period
subsequent to World War I, when the previous nearlysteady rise in
the volume of railroad traffic was finally interrupted.
'Ibid., pp. 96-97.
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